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Capital structure has been one of the most broadly argued subjects in corporate 
finance. 
Since the study of Modigliani and Miller (1958), the question has been raised that 
how the mixture of debt and equity in capital structure affects the firm value. In addition, 
the factors that can have impacts on firm’s capital structure are very argumentative 
subject in the finance literature. So far there have been many studies conducted on the 
determinants of capital structure. Among various factors, asset liquidity is one of the 
most important external influencing factors, it is also one of the most obvious financial 
characteristics of the firm. 
In 2006, the subprime mortgage crisis which started in the United States and soon 
turned to the Global Financial Crisis showed that the market's trust crisis triggered the 
lack of institutional liquidity. In the midst of the crisis, many financial institutions had 
difficulties in raising funds in the short-term to respond to customers' “swings” and thus 
collapsed. This reflects the importance of asset liquidity to the market. After the Global 
Financial Crisis, Chinese firms have attached great importance to the proportion of cash 
flow in business operations. The research shows that the total monetary assets account 
for about 22% of the total assets in China's listed firms, the net total fixed assets account 
for 24.32% of the total assets, and the average asset-liability ratio is about 45%. 
From the existing research results, different conclusions about the impact of asset 
liquidity on capital structure of the firm can be derived. Some researchers support the 
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positive correlation between the capital structure and asset liquidity, while others 
conclude that capital structure is negatively correlated with asset liquidity. Based on the 
above-mentioned background and research status, this thesis selects the data of 30 
Chinese listed companies operating in real estate industry in 2013 - 2017 and listed on 
the Hong Kong Stock Exchange for empirical analysis. The aim of this thesis is to 
investigate whether there is a significant correlation between the capital structure and 
asset liquidity, with other firm-level characteristics such as asset tangibility and 
profitability added to extend the past studies. 
The main ideas of this thesis are to find relevant research questions, make 
reasonable assumptions, research and solve problems, and combine theoretical research 
with empirical research. In chapter two, we describe the causes, theories and 
development of recent financial crisis, which help us to understand the importance of 
asset liquidity overall. In chapter three, we analyze and elaborate existing representative 
literature and research results. In particular, we describe the past research of the 
relationship between the capital structure and asset liquidity. Also, we introduce the 
influencing factors of capital structure. In chapter four, we make empirical tests for our 
hypotheses, and we select the data from the annual reports of Chinese listed firms 
operating in real estate industry during the 2013 to 2017 period. Then, we select firms’ 
capital structure, liquidity, asset tangibility, profitability indicators to construct a 
multiple linear regression model. After that, we perform pooled Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS), fixed effects analysis, and random effect analyses on the panel data of the 
regression model, and we use Hausmann test for both fixed effects and random effects 
 11 
models to decide which model we should use. In chapter five, we combine with the 
above-mentioned theoretical and empirical analyses to get our conclusions and the 
policy recommendations and research outlook. 
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2. Financial Macroeconomics in a Post-Crisis Era 
In this chapter, we mainly focus on the 2006-2007 global financial crisis and the 
subsequent great recession of 2008-2009. First, we describe the development of 
macroeconomic and financial markets before the crisis, which contains some of the 
fuses that have caused the financial crisis. Then we explain the impact of the financial 
crisis, and the measures taken in the face of the crisis and the subsequent development. 
2.1 Pre-Crisis Development 
The causes of the 2006-2007 global financial crisis have been analyzed by scholars 
and many have come to different conclusions as to which cause is at the core of the 
crisis. Now, we describe the macroeconomic and financial market development in a 
pre-crisis era. 
2.1.1 Macroeconomic and Financial Market Development 
The deep institutional reason for the subprime mortgage crisis lies in deregulation 
The US financial regulators could not control over the size and quantity of subprime 
loans and various derivatives, and ignored the potential financial risks in the market, 
which all reflect poor supervision. Deregulation has always been the management 
method that Alan Greenspan has advocated, and the US central bank lowered the 
standards of mortgage loans during his time as the chairman of the Federal Reserve 
System (Fed), which resulted in that more lenders with poor living conditions 
purchased houses through lower costs loans. The lack of strict supervision by US 
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regulators on market rating agencies has also led to the subjectivity of rating agencies 
in rating subprime-related products, and greatly reduced the rating of subprime-related 
products in a large scale. It has hurt investors' confidence and deepened investor panic, 
which eventually led to panic on a global scale. 
Because of the financial deregulation by government, access to mortgage loans 
has become extremely easy since mid-1990s. In order to promote economic growth and 
employment, Fed cut interest rates thirteen times in a row. The federal funds rate fell 
from 6.5% to a historically low level of 1% from 2001-2003. Too low interest rates 
have triggered loose credit, which has also directly boom the people's investment by 
loans. More and more people with unstable living conditions have joined the ranks of 
buyers through bank loans. That was, because the market's general expectations for the 
US housing market were too high, finally it stimulated the US housing market. House 
prices soared by about 85% between 1996 and 2006, which laid the seeds for the 
outbreak of the subprime mortgage crisis. 
For financial derivatives, their development is conducive to the efficiency of funds 
using, but its pricing and trading depends on accurate market evaluation. When there is 
a problem with the market rating agency, the crisis of confidence begins. Because global 
investors trust the three major credit rating agencies1 in the United States, they can be 
able to buy subprime-related products with confidence. The same level of US Treasury 
bonds as triple-a securities rated by these rating agencies become the garbage in the 
                                                 
1 The three major credit rating agencies – Moody's, Standard & Poor's and Fitch – controlling nearly the 
entire market. 
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hands of investors overnight. The unrealistic rating of these rating agencies and the 
slowdown in the rating movement after the outbreak of the subprime mortgage crisis 
have also increased the intensity of the subprime mortgage crisis to a certain extent, 
which has contributed to the negative impact of this crisis. 
In addition, real wages have risen as a result of falling prices in the United States 
or deflation in the European Union. In the case of the US, the real average hourly 
earnings were decreasing over the pre-crisis period due to an increase in consumer 
prices. When the recession began, prices fell quickly, and consequently, real hourly 
earnings have increased. In fact, the crisis has contributed to correcting a deterioration 
in real hourly wages that was driven by rising inflation and stagnant nominal wages 
prior to the downturn of 2008-2009. 
2.1.2 Main Economic Theory Explanations of the Global Financial Crisis 
a) New Keynesian Theory 
New Keynesianism refers to the theory that some non-Keynesian ideas and 
methods are formed on the basis of Keynesianism after the 1970s. The non-market 
clearing assumption2 (sticky prices and wages) is the most important assumption of 
New Keynesian theory, which is derived from the original Keynesianism. The other 
assumption is that the New Keynesianism believes firms are in imperfectly competitive 
                                                 
2The basic implication of non-market clearing is that wages and prices cannot be adjusted quickly to make the 
market clear after a demand shock or supply shock. Slow wage and price adjustments require a long process for 
the economy to return to the state of normal production. It is also called sticky prices and wages. 
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markets rather than perfectly competitive markets, which means firms are price maker. 
Moreover, New Keynesian theory believes that during the economic recession, the role 
of monetary policy is limited because of liquidity trap3 , and wage reduction is not 
effective. Using fiscal policy and increasing government spending should be effective 
measures to deal with the financial crisis, increase employment and slow down the 
economic recession. In addition, the increase or decrease in the money supply of the 
central bank will cause the interest rate to fall or rise. Under the condition that the 
marginal efficiency of capital is certain, the decline of interest rate will cause the 
investment to increase, and the rise of the interest rate will cause the investment to 
decrease. The increase or decrease of investment will cause the same direction of 
expenditure and income to change through the multiplier effect. For a long time, in 
order to stimulate economic growth, the US government has been pursuing an 
expansionary fiscal deficit policy and issuing a large amount of government bonds. 
Especially after 2000, the US Nasdaq stock market bubble burst and the US was at risk 
of economic recession. In line with the expansionary fiscal deficit policy, the Fed has 
also continuously reduced interest rates, resulting in long-term interest rates in the low 
level. United States. On the other hand, due to the relaxation of banking regulation, 
allowing banks to engage in speculative business, the return rate of some high-risk 
                                                 
3 When the interest rate has no ability to decrease in a certain period of time, people will expect the interest 
rate rise and the bond price to fall in the future. The elasticity of money demand will become infinite, that is, even 
there are more currency added, people will store them. In the event of a liquidity trap, a loose monetary policy 
cannot change market interest rates, which makes monetary policy ineffective. 
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products was as high as 25%. A large amount of loans and debts made credit risk 
extremely high, so the outbreak of credit crisis in 2007 triggered the financial crisis. 
b) New Classical Theory  
New Classical theory emphasizes the role of the market in economic development 
and believes that economic development can achieve balanced development through 
the “invisible hand” of the market. The main points include: opposition to state 
intervention and program regulation, the free market dominant model is the most 
effective; the state's functions are to protect private property rights and regulate the 
supply of money and other limited economic functions; relax the regulation of capital 
and financial markets to achieve trade and financial liberalization. Moreover, it assumes 
there are the rational expectations, which means that the subjective expectation of 
economic agents on economic variables will be consistent with the true or objective 
mathematical conditional expectations of these variables. On the contrary to New 
Keynesian theory, prices and wages are not rigid but flexible. 
While under the conditions of the New Classical system, workers and trade unions 
were in a disadvantaged position. And the lack of assistance and corresponding policy 
guarantees, it is difficult to guarantee their income and growth. Due to insufficient 
construction of guaranteed housing, low-income people could only buy houses through 
mortgage loans, so they became the main debtors of the financial crisis. This group 
lacked sufficient resources of income, so its debt repayment ability was weak. When 
rising interest rates made it hard to repay debt on meager wages, credit risk was 
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concentrated, triggering the financial crisis. On the other hand, since eighty percent of 
wealth is concentrated in the hands of twenty percent of the people (Pareto 1906), the 
surplus value of the capitalists in the United States has not entered the production field, 
but has invested in the field of financial speculation. The overheating of real estate has 
caused overproduction in the real estate sector, while the consumption in other sectors 
also had overproduction. Trade liberalization and financial globalization advocated by 
New Classical theory further aggravate the economic turbulence in the world. Due to 
the deregulation of financial institutions, funds were arbitrarily flowing in and out. The 
developed countries led by the United States rely on their trade liberalization and 
financial globalization to promote a higher degree of socialization of production, so that 
production materials and financial assets were concentrated in a few countries. The gap 
between the rich and the poor on a global scale has further increased. Adapting to the 
requirements of international monopoly capital expansion and economic globalization, 
emerging markets exported commodities, resources and services to developed countries 
so that accumulated a large amount of foreign exchange reserves. Therefore, when the 
US financial crisis broke out, it quickly spread to the whole world. 
2.2 Global Financial Crisis and Great Recession 
The Global Financial Crisis was largely unexpected and due to its complex roots, 
it continued to puzzle both policymakers and economists as it unravelled and sucked in 
at first banks and companies, and then economies across the globe. 
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2.2.1 Factors Behind the Crisis 
From the global financial crisis experience, we can get four core and interrelated 
factors, which are showed in Fig.2.1. 
Fig.2.1 Key factors Behind the Global Financial Crisis 
Source: http://ftp.iza.org/dp4934.pdf 
The financial crisis that started in the United States in mid-2007 eventually spread 
around the world to both advanced and developing economies resulting in the worst 
recession since the Second World War. In spite of the severity of the crisis, the way in 
which countries were affected by the recession in terms of economic contraction and 
subsequent deterioration in labour markets remained widely divergent. 
In fact, diversity is a sign of the Great Recession of 2008-2009. Since the United 
States went into recession at the end of 2007, most advanced economies have joined 
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the ranks, particularly those exposed through financial and later trade channels. But, at 
the same time, others, particularly in the Asia region (namely China and India but also 
Australia), have avoided a major contraction, despite their integration with the global 
economy. In fact, in contrast to some of the early predictions, the impact of the crisis 
on developing countries has been far from universal. The most severely affected were 
middle-incomes countries, especially in Central and Eastern Europe and the 
Commonwealth of Independent States. This has been driven by the combination of the 
credit crunch4 and domestic imbalances such as large current account deficits and 
housing bubbles. Overall, the smaller, more open economies have been hit harder, while 
the larger emerging economies have been supported by domestic demand and 
government spending. China has especially continued to grow strongly during the crisis. 
2.2.2 Effects on the United States 
The Great Depression had a major economic and political impact on the United 
States. Although the recession lasted technically from December 2007 to June 2009, 
many important economic variables did not return to pre-recession levels until 2011-
2016. For example, real GDP fell by $650 billion (4.3%) and it was not until the third 
quarter of 2011 that it regained its pre-recession level of $15 trillion. Household net 
worth (reflecting the value of the stock market and house prices) fell by $11.5 trillion 
                                                 
4 A credit crunch occurs when there is a lack of funds available in the credit market, making it difficult for 
borrowers to obtain financing. A credit crunch can do a lot of damage to the economy by stifling economic growth 
through decreased capital liquidity and the reduced ability to borrow. When coupled with a recession, a credit 
crunch will often lead to many corporate bankruptcies. 
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(17.3%) until the third quarter of 2012, when the pre-recession level of $66.4 trillion 
was regained. As of May 2014, the number of employed people decreased by 8.6 
million (6.2%) and did not regain the pre-recession level of 183.3 million. The 
unemployment rate peaked at 10.0% in October 2009 and did not return to 4.7% before 
the recession until May 2016. 
A key driver of slowing economic recovery is that individuals and businesses 
repay debt for several years instead of borrowing, spending or investing as historically. 
This shift to private sector surpluses has driven a considerable government deficit. 
However, the federal government has spent about $3.5 trillion (reduced its percentage 
of GDP) since the 2009-2014 fiscal year, which is a form of deflation. 
2.2.3 Effects on Europe 
Since many countries choose to use taxpayer funds to save their banking systems, 
the European crisis generally develops from a banking system crisis to a sovereign debt 
crisis. The difference in Greece is that it faces huge public debt rather than problems in 
the banking system. Some countries have received bailout packages from the troika 
(European Commission, European Central Bank, International Monetary Fund), which 
has also implemented a series of emergency measures. 
Many European countries began implementing austerity plans between 2010 and 
2011, reducing budget deficits relative to GDP. For example, according to the CIA 
World Profile, Greece increased its budget deficit from 10.4% in 2010 to 9.6% in 2011. 
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Iceland, Italy, Ireland, Portugal, France and Spain have improved the budget deficits 
from 2010 to 2011 compared to 2010. 
However, with the exception of Germany, the public debt-to-GDP ratio of each of 
these countries has increased from 2010 to 2011. For unemployment rate, it has 
increased from 2010 to 2011 in Spain, Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal and the United 
Kingdom (CIA World Profile). There have been no major changes in France, while in 
Germany and Iceland, the unemployment rate has fallen. Eurostat reported that the 
unemployment rate in the euro zone reached a record level of 11.6% in September 2012, 
up from 10.3% last year. 
2.2.4 Effects on Other Countries 
In the era of the Great Depression, Poland and Slovakia were the only two 
members of the European Union to avoid a decline in GDP. As of December 2009, the 
Polish economy has not yet fallen into recession, or even contracted. Although India, 
Uzbekistan, China and Iran have slowed their economic growth, they have not entered 
a recession. South Korea barely avoided a technical recession in the first quarter of 
2009. The International Energy Agency said that South Korea was only large OECD 
country to avoid the 2009 recession. Australia experienced a technical decline after only 
a quarter of negative growth in the fourth quarter of 2008, and GDP grew positively 
after 2009. 
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2.3 Macroeconomics after the Crisis 
Because of the huge impacts caused by global financial crisis, governments across 
the globe increasingly recognized the severity of the downturn and the urgency to 
intervene in order to avoid a catastrophic collapse of the financial markets and real 
economy. For macroeconomic theory, the Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium 
(DSGE) model has been improved. For regulation, Macro and micro prudential 
regulation has been established. 
2.3.1 Link between Macroeconomy and Financial Market Development 
a) Fire Sale 
The fire sale can be seen as a forced sale of an asset at a dislocated price. The asset 
sale is forced in the sense that the seller cannot pay creditors without selling assets. 
Assets sold in fire sales can trade at prices far below value in best use, causing severe 
losses to sellers. Fire sales can also lead to fragility of financial markets during crises. 
When a fire sale leads to a sharp reduction in an asset’s price, similar assets held by 
other market participants decline in value as well, which might bring them also to 
financial distress and forced asset sales. This self-reinforcing process can lead to 
downward spirals or cascades in asset prices and net worth of market participants. 
Because of fire sales, risk becomes systemic. Through this process, asset fire sales and 
the deterioration of the net worth of firms and financial institutions can severely 
undermine financial intermediation, leading to reductions of real investment and output. 
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Economic theory suggests that fire sales can lead to reduced efficiency. Before this 
incident, banks may over-extend their balance sheets if they make mistakes or fail to 
take into account the social costs of fire sales. After the incident, fire sales weakened 
the ability of financial institutions and companies to lend and to borrow by lowering 
their net worth. The existence of externality provides a reason for policy intervention. 
Some policies aim to reduce the likelihood of a fire sale scenario. Similarly, 
policies such as mandated higher discounts and profits in the derivatives market are 
designed to stop the deleveraging and fire sales cycle before it starts. During the fire 
sales period, many major financial institutions (such as banks) were put on hold due to 
lack of access to funds. In this case, two different ways are proposed to increase bank 
loans and actual investments: 1) the government can lend to banks against risky 
collateral; 2) the government can directly purchase assets or provide subsidies for 
certain asset purchasers. 
Diamond and Rajan (2010) support that government injects liquid assets into the 
banking system, they believe that wrong government purchases may distort asset prices 
in other directions and even lead to losses. On the other hand, Shleifer and Vishny 
(2010b) believe that injecting liquidity into the banking system may not increase asset 
prices or lead to new loans to businesses. Instead, banks may take preventive hoarding 
liquidity or may purchase assets, but still keep their prices far below the level at which 
new loans become attractive. Another problem with lending or equity to banks is that 
the government may ultimately support the institutions that ultimately fail, and may 
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encourage some desperate intermediaries to gamble on government funds by taking on 
more risks. Buying securities can address asset price dislocations directly, without 
providing extra subsidies to weak or irresponsible banks. To avoid overpayment of 
assets, government purchases may target potentially less toxic asset classes, with better 
prospects for recovering new loans in the short term and less likely to be lost by the 
government. 
The US government has taken many forms to deal with the financial crisis and 
especially the fire sales policy. The government rescued some financial institutions, but 
also lent money against risky collateral and purchased some assets. Prior to the 
bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, the provision of liquidity to 
financial institutions was the main strategy; in 2009, the purchase of institutional debt 
became very important. Fed’s Chairman Ben Bernanke (2009) described the Fed's 
credit easing policy for the winter of 2009, and his reasons seemed to correspond 
primarily to the fire sales analysis provided here. Shleifer and Vishny (2010b) describe 
the virtuous cycles and multipliers generated by government safe purchases as market 
liquidity improves. What emerges most clearly from the fire-sales models is the 
complementarity between tough preventive policies to reduce the risk of fire sales and 
soft policies when a fire sale and financial crisis is underway.  
The basic prescription for these models is that the government intervenes in the 
market to stop fire sales quickly, because failure to do so can seriously damage the 
financial system and the overall economy. Although the choice is a controversial option, 
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we believe that the government supports market participants to buy dislocated securities 
and even buy them directly, rather than supporting weak or underperforming financial 
institutions. However, in the face of actual crises, this type of softness works best when 
combined with safeguards that minimize the chance that the banking system becomes 
engulfed in fire sales. 
b) Shadow Banking 
Shadow Bank, also known as the shadow banking system, refers to loans such as 
real estate loans being processed into valuable securities and traded to the capital 
market. The real estate industry has traditionally been financed by the banking system, 
it belongs to the bank's securitization activities, also known as the Parallel Banking 
System. 
The higher the leverage ratio, the higher the degree to which the asset price 
deviates from its actual value, and the corresponding risk is greater. People are not 
unclear about this, but at the stage of rising house prices, the shadow banking system 
earns a lot of profits and its participation. The huge gains from securitization have 
stunned, and people ignore the huge risks and blow up the asset bubble. However, from 
2007, the real estate market began to deviate from people's expectations, and house 
prices fell. At this time, the second and third types of lenders immediately fell into 
trouble, and their usual countermeasures were arrears of payments, and the mortgage 
delinquency rate began to rise. After the loan delinquency rate of the entire financial 
system increased, commercial banks had to raise the loan standard and only lend money 
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to the first class of lenders, which led to a sudden decrease in market liquidity. Due to 
the leverage effect of these securitized products, the book value of the banking system 
assets has rapidly declined. Some commercial banks have fallen into the insolvency 
situation, and shadow banks have also been run on. Because these shadow banks rely 
mainly on short-term notes in the money market to purchase long-term assets with a 
large amount of high risk and low liquidity, and in this way to realize the unlimited 
expansion of credit, which makes it fragile when it faces to runs. Finally, the money 
markets panicked, thousands of highly leveraged hedge funds ran out of money, and 
the property bubble burst. Finally, the currency market panicked, thousands of high-
leverage hedge funds were redeemed, and the bubble caused by the overheating of the 
real estate market was shattered. 
In the shadow banking system, there is also a role that cannot be ignored, namely 
rating agencies, which have been criticized in the financial crisis for their irresponsible 
performance in the rating process. The securities derived from the subprime loans are 
extremely risky, but they are highly rated and are therefore being pursued by people. In 
fact, the rating agencies have made rating results that were not in line with the real 
situation because of conflicts of interest. For some highly leveraged structured financial 
products, because of the high risk, their issuers are often willing to pay higher rating 
fees, which creates the problem of “adverse selection”5. Now, these high-risk financial 
products have become the main source of income for rating agencies, which makes it 
                                                 
5 The adverse selection refers to the phenomenon that the quality of market-traded products declines due to 
the inferior quality of goods sold by the two sides of the transaction and the deterioration of market prices. 
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difficult for rating agencies to make independent and fair evaluations. Moreover, the 
competition between rating agencies is becoming increasingly fierce. Even if some 
rating agencies give unsatisfied ratings for securities issuers based on fair principles, 
securities issuers can switch to other rating agencies. Therefore, in order to survive in 
the competition, these institutions give a less fair result. While in the market, due to 
information asymmetry, investors have no more sources of information, and can only 
believe that the results given by rating agencies have formed a “herd effect”6. 
After recognizing the excessive growth of leverage in the financial crisis, it is 
widely believed that more stringent legal norms should be developed. The reformed 
regulatory system acts as a systematic prudential regulator, and it must be able to do 
two important tasks: first, it collects, researches, and publishes systematic information 
that includes a broader range of financial institutions, such as shadow banking systems; 
second, it must be able to implement the rules on capital adequacy from a systemic 
perspective. In this system, the central bank should play a more important role because 
it is the monetary policy maker and the lender of last resort, and it can intervene when 
necessary. In any case, if the troubled institutions seek help from the central bank, the 
central bank must conduct an accurate and impartial investigation of its real situation. 
The best way to do this is through the network and with other regulatory agencies. 
c) Fragile Financial System 
                                                 
6 The herd effect is a typical phenomenon in the field of behavioral finance, which cannot be explained by 
mainstream financial theory. In economics, the “herd effect” is often used to describe the follow-up mentality of 
economic individuals. 
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Information asymmetry is the root of financial fragility. Under the condition of 
information asymmetry, financial institutions such as banks have inherent fragility, 
while moral hazard and adverse selection further aggravate the banking crisis. 
Information asymmetry mainly includes information asymmetry between borrowers 
and financial institutions and information asymmetry between depositors and financial 
institutions. In the former case, improper incentives and moral hazard are important 
reasons for the plight of financial institutions, while the latter explains the reasons for 
bank runs, indicating that finance is based on collective confidence. 
Macroeconomic instability is the main reason for the fragility of financial markets. 
Many economists believe that macroeconomic instability leads to excessive 
fluctuations in financial asset prices, especially stock market prices. The excessive 
volatility of financial asset prices and their linkage effects are often the important 
sources of financial market fragility. When risks accumulate under certain conditions, 
they form a crisis. The important reason for the fluctuation of asset prices is excessive 
speculation caused by irrational market collective behavior. 
The modern banking system determines the bank's risky impulses. On the one 
hand, the banking industry is a highly indebted operating industry. On the other hand, 
many banking crises make people realize that the government will surely help the banks, 
which makes the depositors gradually lose the enthusiasm to supervise the banks. 
Therefore, the inherent financial fragility caused by the main defects of modern banking 
system is the source of the subprime crisis. 
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Asset securitization has increasingly integrated credit markets and capital markets. 
Although the risks of the banking sector can be dispersed into the capital market 
through securitization, the information asymmetry is intensified due to the extension of 
bank financing, and the financial fragility represented by moral hazard has also 
increased. As far as the mortgage securitization chain is concerned, there are six main 
links. In each link, the purpose of each stakeholder is different. The government hopes 
that the housing ownership rate will increase and the financial system will remain stable. 
The borrower hopes that the interest rate cost will decrease. The lender hopes to spread 
the risk through securitization and obtain more service fees. Government Sponsored 
Enterprises (GSE) 7buy packaged loans to generate more collateral and service income. 
The investors want to invest safely and achieve certain benefits. 
Moral hazard exists in the interest competition in information asymmetry. First, 
the bank sells the mortgage after the loan. The risk of default is not important, which 
makes it pay less attention to the quality of the loan. When more loans are issued, the 
bank can get more service fee income, and the bank will do further reverse selection: 
sell high-risk mortgage loans to pass on risks, and retain high-quality assets. Second, 
housing GSE can use the government potential credit support and various preferential 
conditions to obtain high profits in the process of mortgage securitization. The above-
mentioned securitization chain motivated by income has repeatedly relaxed the loan 
                                                 
7 A government-sponsored enterprise is a quasi-governmental entity established to enhance the flow of credit 
to specific sectors of the American economy. Created by acts of Congress, these agencies, though privately held, 
provide public financial services. GSEs help to facilitate borrowing for all sorts of individuals, from students to 
farmers to homeowners. 
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credit standard. The institutions in all aspects of securitization have lost the supervision 
and incentive effect on the quality of long-term loans, the quality of mortgage loans has 
declined, financial fragility has increased. It can be seen that under the specific 
information structure, the financial market forms financial fragility through the 
automatic rational choice and behavior change of economic agents. Once a link breaks 
(price declines), the hidden risks are bound to surface, causing a subprime crisis 
Therefore, the challenge is to develop a regulatory system that will prevent the similar 
risk-taking behaviour witnessed in the lead up to the sub-prime crisis. 
2.3.2 Improvement of a Core Macroeconomic Model 
As a key macroeconomic model, the Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium 
(DSGE) model has developed rapidly in the last three decades and has become one of 
the important analytical tools for central banks and institutions such as the Fed and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) to make economic forecasts. 
To put it simply, the DSGE model studies the general equilibrium problem of the 
economy under risk, and explores how actual shocks (such as technology shocks or 
interest rate shocks) are transmitted and trigger economic fluctuations. It describes the 
dynamic change of variables such as GDP, consumption, investment, price, wage, 
employment and interest rate. Because it is focused on an uncertain situation, the 
dynamic optimization method is used to describe the decision-making behavior of each 
economic entity, and the conditional equations such as resource constraints, technical 
constraints, information constraints, and market clearing conditions are used to 
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construct the overall economy. The equations to be satisfied are solved, and the 
equations are solved to obtain the economic growth expectation under the general 
framework. 
As the global economy gradually emerged from the recession and recovered in an 
orderly manner, many scholars began to reflect on the weaknesses of the DSGE model 
and made targeted improvements of it. For instance, the medium-sized DSGE model 
developed by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York has been extensively studied, and 
scholars have introduced new variables and constraints based on this model. The basic 
structure of its four departments became as follows: 
Enterprises: manufacturers and financing institutions were included, with 
manufacturers affected by changes in productivity, while financing institutions affected 
by changes in investment demand; Family: Providing labor, consuming products, and 
providing deposits to banks. Affected by changes in labor supply and consumer price 
increases; Government: Taxing households and businesses and issuing bonds, facing 
currency and fiscal policy shocks; Bank: Providing loans to enterprises, generating 
credit friction and being affected by changes in interest rate spread. 
The traditional financial accelerator framework reflects the impact of financial 
friction through the loan relationship between the family and the enterprise. Due to the 
information asymmetry and agency problems in the credit market, the external 
financing cost is higher than the internal financing, and the net asset value of the 
enterprise will change when it encounters an external shock. Then it affects its internal 
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financing capacity, and the shift to external financing will face rising financing costs, 
so the external financing of the supply side in credit market magnifies the initial 
external impact of the manufacturer. After the financial crisis, scholars refined the 
analysis of financial shocks. For instance, Christiano et al (2010) studied the impact of 
several financial factors: agency problems in financial contracts, liquidity constraints 
of banks themselves, and changes in market risk expectations. Walqueetal (2010) 
established a DSGE model that included the interbank market as the risk premium 
caused by the bank's financial debt default also creates a financial accelerator. 
Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) further developed the DSGE model that introduced 
the financial accelerator mechanism to reflect the impact of the financial crisis. In the 
previous model, only entity manufacturers had credit constraints, and the banking 
system itself had no financing constraints. The newly developed model introduced the 
bank as an intermediary between savers and manufacturers, and the bank had an 
endogenous credit constraint mechanism, which can reflect how credit friction 
amplifies the impact of exogenous shocks on the real economy. The model simulated 
how endogenous credit constraints affected lending behavior when bank capital 
decreased. The model also simulated the liquidity impact banks faced when banks were 
unwilling to lend each other. However, the central bank can resolve this shock. Unlike 
commercial banks, the central bank does not have an endogenous credit constraint 
mechanism. It can intervene in the credit market through unconventional monetary 
policies to reduce financial market friction caused by credit constraints and weaken the 
impact on the real economy. 
 33 
The US agencies such as the New York Federal Reserve has mainly studied the 
DSGE model to serve the formulation of monetary policy, the core of which is the 
interest rate policy. In addition to introducing credit spreads, Curdia and Ferrero (2012) 
also conducted a comparative analysis of the effective real interest rate or the nominal 
equilibrium interest rate to construct a DSGE model. It was found that the selection of 
effective real interest rates in a perfectly competitive economy can greatly improve the 
accuracy of the DSGE model. 
All in all, these DSGE models have been significantly improved in their structure 
from the pre-crisis era, and the accuracy of prediction has increased significantly. 
2.3.3 Macro- and Micro Prudential Policies after the Crisis 
In this new, post-crisis era of regulatory systems, some of the anachronistic things 
before the crisis will be abandoned, securitization will be subject to more stringent 
regulation. The negative impact of excessive leverage and maturity mismatch on 
financial stability will also receive greater attention. The financial system serves the 
real economy, and it cannot operate independently from the real economy. Therefore, 
the establishment of various financial institutions will be based on a more "practical" 
perspective to support the development of the real economy. 
In response to the financial crisis, financial sector regulation has been intensified 
and expanded in scope. Macroprudential regulation has been established as a new 
policy field complementing microprudential regulation and other macroeconomic 
policies, notably monetary policy. A key lesson of the Global Financial Crisis has been 
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that proper microprudential supervision of financial institutions and their risks is a 
necessary, but not a sufficient condition to ensure financial stability. Conceptually, 
microprudential regulation and supervision treats the (macroeconomic) risks faced by 
financial institutions as being exogenous. By construction, general equilibrium effects 
and macroeconomic implications are not taken into account. In this respect, 
macroprudential regulation and supervision complement microprudential regulation 
and supervision by adding a system- wide perspective. Linkages across the financial 
system and linkages to the real economy are explicitly taken into account. 
Both microprudential and macroprudential authorities use prudential policy 
instruments and tools that are applied at the level of the individual firm. But they can 
do so with different objectives. Microprudential policy adjusts capital based on 
individual institutions’ risks, while macroprudential policy adjusts overall levels of 
capital based on the financial cycle and systemic relevance to guard against systemic 
risk buildup. Macroprudential policy can also involve regulation of markets more 
generally (which can thus raise issues of coordination with market regulators) and 
extend to entities in the shadow banking sector. In addition, systemic risk can evolve in 
reaction to financial innovation or regulations. Therefore, the perimeter of 
macroprudential policy and its active instruments may need to adjust over time. 
The macro-prudential supervisory architecture of the EU was established right 
after the financial crisis and the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) has been in 
place as an integrated financial supervisor for macro-prudential supervision since 2011. 
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The ESRB's aim is to identify systemic risks in the financial system and to propose 
measures to eliminate them, employing warnings and recommendations, which are 
subject to a “comply or explain” mechanism. ESRB can play a crucial role in improving 
efficiency and effectiveness of macroprudential policy making: First, the ESRB has a 
comparative advantage in analyzing and addressing macro-prudential issues that 
involve the cross-border and cross-sectoral dimension. Therefore, one might strengthen 
the ESRB’s capabilities to focus on these issues. To this end, cooperation with the 
European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs)8 should be intensified in order to enhance 
its cross-sectorial analytical capacities. Second, the ESRB needs access to relevant data 
and information, and data sharing among members has to be facilitated. Third, and most 
importantly, the ESRB provides a valuable platform for the exchange of experiences in 
macro-prudential policy making. In order to enhance this role, the ESRB could act as a 
hub for the ex-post evaluation of macro-prudential policies by coordinating and 
facilitating analytical work. 
3. Asset Liquidity and Capital Structure: Theory and 
International Evidence 
For the market, liquidity is the essence of the market, and the financial crisis is 
essentially a crisis of lack of liquidity. At present, the academic research on liquidity 
                                                 
8 The European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS) was created as response to the financial crisis and 
became operational in 2011. This new institutional architecture, consisting of the three European Supervisory 
Authorities (ESAs) - the European Banking Authority (EBA), the European Securities and Markets Authority 
(ESMA) and the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) 
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mainly focuses on solvency, transaction cost and risk management. The factors 
influencing the capital structure are complex and systematic. From a macro perspective, 
the size of the financing market, the financing environment, and the national laws all 
have complex effects on the capital structure of listed companies. From a micro 
perspective, corporate management behavior, internal supervision and auditing systems, 
and protection of investor rights and interests also have significant impact on the capital 
structure. 
3.1 Research on Asset Liquidity 
John Maynard Keynes first proposed and developed the definition of asset 
liquidity in “A Treatise on Money” (1930) and then in “The General Theory of 
Employment, Interest, and Money" (1936, see Keynes, 2006). It is also the most classic 
definition of liquidity now, that is, the liquidity refers to the ability of assets can be 
converted into cash with small losses. The three main purposes of a company holding 
liquid assets are trading, prevention and speculation. In other words, the purpose of the 
existence of liquid assets in the enterprise is to meet the unexpected cash needs of the 
daily operation of the enterprise. Liquid assets are also used to pay debts, reduce 
bankruptcy costs and obtain income through investment. At the same time, enterprises 
also need to bear the cost of holding liquid assets when considering liquidity. The main 
cost structure is the cost of raising capital in the market and the opportunity cost of 
holding cash assets. The stronger the liquidity of a company, the faster the company's 
cash circulation and the stronger its short-term solvency. 
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Hawawini and Viallet (1983) believed that liquidity is represented by the ratio of 
the equity assets and debt assets to operating assets of enterprises, but fixed assets are 
excluded. This indicator measures the turnover rate of corporate cash, the higher the 
ratio, the stronger the liquidity of the company and the stronger the short-term solvency. 
Van horne (1983) defines liquidity as cash and other assets that converted into cash 
easily. Liquidity is divided into generalized liquidity and narrow liquidity. Narrow 
liquidity does not consider the possible discount and only considers speed of converting 
into cash, it also can be defined that maintain a stable valuation of asset prices to see if 
they can trade smoothly. 
Tobin (1968) believes that the transaction costs generated by realizing assets 
reflect the liquidity of assets. Liquidity relies on the improvement of market mechanism. 
The essence of liquidity is the capital and time cost of asset trading. Therefore, liquidity 
consists of two layers. The first is the cost of capital generated by the transaction, and 
the second is the time-consuming cost to wait until the expected transaction price occurs. 
Mitchems (1990) research indicates that corporate financial risk can be measured 
more accurately by measuring corporate liquidity. The enterprise's current liabilities 
and the cash flow required for business operations are used as indicators. If the indicator 
is larger, the company's external financing is more liquid. 
Sartoris Hill (1994) argues that asset liquidity and corporate liquidity should be 
measured separately. Asset liquidity should follow Keynes's definition and theory, 
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while corporate liquidity should be rather measured by whether the company can pay 
off debts and whether it can pay interest on schedule. 
Ohara (2000) believes that when a company faces the risk of bankruptcy 
liquidation, the amount of income that can be obtained immediately from the sale of 
existing assets is both the liquidity of the enterprise. 
Hoirole (2002) examines the needs and management characteristics of liquidity 
from different stages of business development. The study claims that in the initial and 
rising period of the enterprise, companies need to maintain a high level of liquidity to 
hedge against potential liquidity risks. 
3.2 Research on Capital Structure 
Before the mid-19th century, it was generally believed that the greater the 
proportion of bonds a company has, the higher the financial leverage and the better 
performance of the company. It is a signal to release profits, and the valuation of the 
company is correspondingly higher. However, in 1958, Modigliani–Miller theorem 
proved that the capital structure has nothing to do with the valuation of the firm. 
Modigliani–Miller theorem is the authoritative theory of the formation of 
corporate capital structure proposed by Modigliani and Miller (1958). The theory holds 
that, based on the fact that the company's financing costs remain unchanged, if the 
market is a perfect capital market, the company pursues profit maximization without 
considering the influence of various principal-agent relationships on the target behavior, 
then the company's existing debt. The value of the value and the value of the equity and 
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the present value of the future finance should be a constant. No matter what financing 
method the company chooses, how the proportion of various financing methods 
changes, how the debt value and the equity value change, the company value is 
irrelevant to the capital structure. 
Fama (1978) studied the premise of the MM theorem and established a static trade-
off theory. According to the theory, the limitation of MM theorem is to assume that the 
financial market is a perfect market. This kind of financial market is completely 
competitive and frictionless. This market is ideal and cannot exist in reality. Therefore, 
the theory relaxes the constraints of the MM theorem, and it is most beneficial to 
develop the capital structure from the microscopic perspective and corporate behavior. 
The theory holds that debt has advantages and disadvantages for enterprises. This kind 
of profit is mainly reflected in the fact that the interest on debt can be deducted before 
tax, so the debt is equivalent to a certain net tax revenue; and the disadvantage of debt 
is reflected in the enterprise. Excessive debt required will increase the operating costs 
of the business and cause potential financial risks to the business. Therefore, 
maintaining an appropriate proportion of debt is the result of weighing the pros and 
cons for the business. There are different views on the trade-offs between pros and cons, 
and Modigliani and Miller (1963) expressed optimism about net tax revenues, arguing 
that such gains clearly make the actual cost of corporate debt financing lower, and 
explain that management in the general enterprise chooses more debt financing. 
Alternatives to equity financing; and Mill (1977) argues that debt financing does not 
actually have a theoretical net tax benefit advantage, because as corporate benefits rise, 
 40 
the collection of personal income tax will replace corporate tax evasion, so This kind 
of income is almost non-existent. DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) proposed a net tax 
benefit in the above two views, but the existence of non-debt tax shields, such as 
corporate depreciation, innovative investment, etc., may have a tax-saving effect. 
Fig.3.1 The Trade-Off Theory of Leverage 
Source: http://actuarialsciencestudies.blogspot.com/2012/03/trade-off-theory.html 
Myers (1984) proposed that due to the information asymmetry of the activities of 
enterprises in the market, the conditions emphasized by the static trade-off theory are 
still not realistic enough. Therefore, Myers studies from the perspective of information 
economics and proposes a Pecking order based on information constraints. Enterprises 
have an information advantage when issuing stocks. At this time, potential investors 
have asymmetric information about the company. Therefore, the financing behavior of 
the company conveys the information of the business risk of the investors. Therefore, 
the equity financing usually has a discounted price. Given this situation, companies will 
 41 
give priority to bond financing rather than equity financing. According to Myers (1984), 
companies use the lowest cost of internal funds when financing, followed by debt 
financing. Equity financing usually considers the use because of its high risk, so the 
capital structure of the company usually follows the “internal surplus”. The financing 
level of a debt, a convertible bond, and a stock. 
Fig.3.2 Pecking Order Theory 
Source: https://efinancemanagement.com/financial-leverage/pecking-order-theory 
Berger MJdell (1988) argues that the capital structure of an enterprise is related to 
the growth and growth stages of the firm and proposes a theory of financial growth 
cycle. Enterprises with different industry maturities and different growth potentials of 
the enterprise, different financing methods will be used according to the development 
time, scale and information changes of the enterprise itself, and various financing 
channels under different circumstances The proportion will also change accordingly, 
which will affect the capital structure of the company. 
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Mayer (1990) conducted an in-depth study of the capital structure. The research 
shows that in the developed countries with perfect market systems and mature financing 
markets such as stocks and bonds, the capital structure of listed companies presents a 
greater similarity. Booth et al. (2001) conducted relevant research in developing 
countries for this conclusion. The research shows that the capital structure of 
developing countries is quite different, and the debt levels of listed companies in 
different developing countries are significantly different. 
Based on the theory of modern information economics, Dowd (1996) proposed 
that due to the asymmetry of information, enterprises have reverse selection, moral 
hazard and high-cost status verification in the three stages before and after financing. 
When designing financing products, corporate finance should consider the cost of 
balancing information asymmetry and enable the information principal to obtain 
appropriate savings and incentives. In general, information asymmetry in financing is 
unfavorable for enterprises, and information asymmetry before and after financing is 
unfavorable to investors. Therefore, because of the existence of moral hazard, 
companies may prefer to conduct equity financing, while reverse selection and high-
cost status verification make companies prefer internal financing. 
In addition, management's own management characteristics and domestic legal 
characteristics are also important determinants of the company's capital structure. 
Research by Harris and Raviv (1988) proves that the management of the company may 
choose the financing methods and financing channels that are more favorable to them 
 43 
in order to protect their own interests, and never evade the risks that enterprises may 
face. This kind of management behavior will affect the capital structure of the company. 
For example, Berger et al. (1997) found that in a company with a well-established 
internal audit system, management may prefer to choose a debt approach for financing 
because of risk aversion, resulting in an increase in the company's financial leverage. 
Pagano et al. (1998) found that in companies that have suffered more legal 
interference in stock issuance, companies will choose to reduce financing in the stock 
market. Garvey and Hanka (1999) studied the capital structure adjustment of listed 
companies in the United States after the promulgation of the second generation anti-
acquisition law. The study found that companies that were protected by the law chose 
to significantly reduce the proportion of external financing to reduce liabilities, proving 
the law on capital structure. Impact. With the deepening of the research, the academic 
community further confirmed that the strictness of the legal restrictions on financing 
will have an impact on the choice of financing methods, which will have a significant 
impact on the capital structure. Wald and Long (2007) compares the strictness of 
restrictions on financing and dividend payments with the laws of registered companies 
in the US state laws, and finds that the stricter restrictions on external financing are 
relatively low, and the lower the company's liabilities, the legal and policy environment 
of the country includes the efficiency of law enforcement. And the impartiality of 
corporate legal characteristics, namely macroscopic factors and institutional factors, not 
only affects the management's financing decisions but also the ability of enterprises to 
finance from the outside. 
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Lemmon and Lins (2003) believes that when investor rights are better protected, 
the valuation of company assets will increase relatively, and the company can also use 
internal financing and equity capital to reduce liabilities, thus affecting the company's 
capital structure. 
3.3 Research on the Correlation between Capital Structure and Asset 
Liquidity 
Keynes (1930) believes that low-liquid assets tend to cause the value of corporate 
bonds to be perceived by investors as high risk and underestimate their value. At this 
time, corporate managers will choose to reduce low-liquidity assets and pass on positive 
signals to investors. 
The Pecking order theory proposed by Myers and Majluf (1984) is a widely 
accepted theory in the theory of negative correlation between capital structure and asset 
liquidity. The theory of superior order financing believes that high liquid assets can be 
understood as a hedge of debt. Highly liquid assets also mean higher corporate debt. 
When managers with high liquidity assets tend to invest in liquid assets in projects with 
positive net present value, they maintain high liquidity and are used to repay in time. 
Period debt, therefore, high liquidity means a lower asset-liability ratio. 
Williamson (1988) believes that from the perspective of financing cost, because 
of the collateral function, assets with higher liquidity can effectively reduce the cost of 
asset management and clearing costs, it has higher security for corporate creditors. In 
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financing, it is usually characterized by easier financing and higher financial leverage, 
so high liquidity will increase the company's asset-liability ratio. 
From the perspective of investor rights, Hairis and Raviv (1990) pointed out that 
investors will judge the profit of the enterprise according to the situation of the company 
paying interest, so as to make a cost analysis based on the signal to the business situation 
of the enterprise, and analyze the enterprise payment under each debt level. The ability 
of interest, through multiple iterations to weigh the cost of default, through the 
intervention of business management policies to select the most appropriate level of 
debt and financial leverage, thereby affecting the company's capital structure. The 
higher the liquidity of assets, the lower the investor's expectation of default cost, the 
negative correlation between asset liquidity and bankruptcy liquidation cost, and a 
positive correlation with financial leverage. 
Shleifer and Vishny (1992) argues that corporate managers often intend to control 
financial leverage to avoid bankruptcy or to maintain a lower bankruptcy liquidation 
cost. In the case of high liquidity of corporate assets, it is easier for enterprises to raise 
funds and meet the cash flow requirements of business operations. Therefore, asset 
liquidity and capital structure are positively correlated. 
Bergen and Yermack (1997) studied asset liquidity and capital structure formation 
from the perspective of information economics. Research shows that the company's 
management may control the level of debt below the optimal structure for a sound 
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management style. Therefore, management may choose a conservative liquidity level 
and debt level in anticipation of high liquidity that will result in high debt. 
Myers and Rajan (1998) believes that corporate liquidity is closely related to 
management's management guidelines. Assuming that the management of the company 
has high management standards and ethics, consistent with the corporate management 
objectives, there is no misappropriation of transferred enterprise assets, and the debt-
to-equity ratio is positively correlated with asset liquidity. Anyway, if the management 
of the company has transferred the company's assets, has moral hazard to the 
management of the enterprise, and exploits the information asymmetry of the investor 
to embezzle the company's assets, the asset-liability ratio will be related to the asset 
liquidity curve. The existence of initial liquidity of assets is initially positively related 
to liabilities, but as the liquidity of assets increases, the debt ratio will decrease again 
at a certain point in time. 
Dc Angelo and Wruck (2001) proposed that high liquidity assets are not a hedge 
of simple corporate liabilities. Instead, they believe that management can repay debts 
in financial crisis through high liquidity assets, and manage the company independently 
by winning time to avoid creditors. Excessive intervention. High liquidity corporate 
assets represent a higher ability to repay debts in the long-term or future. Management 
will consider the risk of bankruptcy in the management by guaranteeing a certain 
percentage of high liquidity assets. In this case, the creditor will shorten the debt 
contract period by requiring the enterprise to repay the interest, or to abandon part of 
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the interest, or to increase the security of the asset by adding mandatory debt clauses in 
the contract. Therefore, asset liquidity will affect the capital structure, and this capital 
structure should be positively related to asset liquidity. 
Litov (2005) concludes with Berner, Ofek and Yermack (1997) through empirical 
research that the stable management is based on a conservative investment strategy and 
considers corporate bankruptcy costs and tax shield returns, preferring to choose capital 
structure with high debt levels. When the capital structure is stable, the cost of structural 
adjustment will affect structural changes and reduce the impact of liquidity levels on 
capital structure. 
3.4 Firm-level Characteristics 
Past researches (Vasiliou and Daskalakis(2009), Ramlall(2009) and 
Oztekin(2009)) on determinants of capital structure used some characteristics such as: 
profitability, tangibility, liquidity, non-debt tax shield, size, volatility, product 
uniqueness, income variability and industry, ownership structure. In this thesis, we use 
the most common and affecting determinants: liquidity, profitability and tangibility are 
suggested as independent variables. 
3.4.1 Liquidity 
Ozkan(2001) indicated that liquidity has ambiguous effect on the capital structure 
decisions. For liquidity, it should be the ratio of current assets to current liabilities. It is 
used to measure the ability of a company's current assets to be converted into cash for 
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repayment of liabilities before the short-term debt expires. Generally, the higher the 
ratio, the stronger the liquidity of corporate assets and the stronger the short-term 
solvency. It is generally considered that the current ratio should be above 2:1. If the 
current ratio is 2:1, it indicates that the current assets are twice the current liabilities. 
Even if half of the current assets cannot be converted into cash in the short term, all the 
current liabilities can be guaranteed to be repaid. 
It should be noted that companies with high current ratios do not necessarily have 
the ability to repay short-term debts. Because cash, securities, and accounts receivable 
have strong liquidity, but inventory, deferred expenses have a longer period to be 
converted into cash, especially in the case of inventory. 





H0: There is a negative relationship between liquidity and leverage; 
H1: There is a positive relationship between liquidity and leverage. 
Hypothesis 1B: 
H0: There is a negative relationship between liquidity and short-term leverage; 
H1: There is a positive relationship between liquidity and short-term leverage. 
Hypothesis 1C: 
H0: There is a negative relationship between liquidity and long-term leverage; 
H1: There is a positive relationship between liquidity and long-term leverage. 
 49 
3.4.2 Profitability 
Past studies done by Ozkan(2001), Gaud et al.(2003), Bevan and Danbolt(2002) 
show a strong inverse relationship between debt ratio and profitability. The ratio of 
earnings before interest and tax to total assets is assumed as measure to profitability. 
The ratio is considered to be an indicator of how effectively a company is using 
its assets to generate earnings. Earnings before Interest and Tax (EBIT) is used instead 
of net profit to keep the metric focused on operating earnings without the influence of 
tax or financing differences when compared to similar companies. 
The value of an asset may decrease or increase over time. In the case of real estate, 
asset values may rise. Since this profitability formula uses the book value of assets on 
the balance sheet, it may substantially underestimate the real market value of fixed 
assets. This leads to a higher ratio where the return on total assets is higher than it should 
be because the denominator is too low. 






H0: There is a negative relationship between profitability and leverage; 
H1: There is a positive relationship between profitability and leverage. 
Hypothesis 2B: 
H0: There is a negative relationship between profitability and short-term leverage; 
H1: There is a positive relationship between profitability and short-term leverage. 
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Hypothesis 2C: 
H0: There is a negative relationship between profitability and long-term leverage; 
H1: There is a positive relationship between profitability and long-term leverage. 
3.4.3 Asset Tangibility 
According to research of Jensen and Meckling(1976), it concluded that asset 
tangibility has positive correlation with debt ratio. What’s more, Bennett and Donnelly 
(2003), Rajan and Zingales(1995) and Gaud et al.(2003) supported this correlation 
based on their evidences. However, Bevan and Danbolt(2000) and Psillaki and 
Daskalakis(2008) said that there is a negative relationship between asset tangibility and 
leverage. We use long-term and short-term leverage for testing this relationship. 






H0: There is a positive relationship between asset tangibility and leverage; 
H1: There is a negative relationship between asset tangibility and leverage. 
Hypothesis 3B: 
H0: There is a positive relationship between asset tangibility and short-term leverage; 
H1: There is a negative relationship between asset tangibility and short-term leverage. 
Hypothesis 3C: 
H0: There is a positive relationship between asset tangibility and long-term leverage; 
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H1: There is a negative relationship between asset tangibility and long-term leverage. 
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4. Empirical Analysis of the Impact of Asset Liquidity on 
Capital Structure 
In this chapter, we will establish the econometric model of this study based on the 
theory of the previous chapters, then we will verify the theoretical part through the 
panel data processing method, and finally get our conclusion. 
4.1 Econometric Model 
In this section, we will process our four econometric models and introduce 
methods that we deal with panel data: fixed effect model and random effect model. 
4.1.1 Research Assumptions and Model Settings 
So far, the research on the company's capital structure and asset liquidity has been 
extensive, but there are few empirical studies starting from the micro perspective. 
Keynes (1930) first proposed a study on capital structure and asset liquidity. He pointed 
out that because of the information asymmetry in the market or the excessive financing 
cost of the company, it is possible that the company's issued bonds values are low, so 
the company managers often choose to hold a large number of highly liquid assets. 
Majluf and Myers (1984) also analyzed the relationship between capital structure and 
asset liquidity at the company level through Pecking order theory. They believe that 
high liquidity assets and cash can be regarded as negative debts. When the business is 
in a bad state and there is not enough investment in some projects with a positive net 
present value, the manager will not choose to repay the debts due and lose liquidity, 
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which means that the asset to liability ratio is higher. This shows that the company's 
capital structure is closely related to asset liquidity. 
Therefore, based on the above analysis, this paper constructs the following 
multiple linear regression model. 
Debt
Equityit








= α0 + β1 Liquidity + β2Profitability + β3 Asset tangibility + εit Model (3) 
LT−Debt
Assetit
= α0 + β1 Liquidity + β2Profitability + β3 Asset tangibility + εit Model (4) 
Among them, α0 is the intercept term, β1, β2, β3 are the regression coefficient 
of the corresponding variable, εit is the random disturbance term, and the specific 
meaning of the dependent variable and the independent variable will be explained 
below. 
4.1.2 Econometric Methods 
Generally, panel data model can be described as: 
Yit = 𝛼𝑖 + Xitβ + uit                             (4.1) 
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For particular individual i, αi represents those factors that do not change over time, 
and in most cases these factors are not directly observable or difficult to quantify, such 
as individual consumption habits, regional economic structure, legal and property rights 
systems, we generally call them as "individual effects". In practice it is assumed that 
individual regression equations have the same slope, but different intercept terms can 
be used to capture heterogeneity, while the unobservable random variable αi represents 
the individual heterogeneity. 
Pooled OLS 
If all individuals have exactly the same regression equation, the model can be 
written as: 
Yit = α + Xitβ + uit                             (4.2) 
We can put all the data together, like doing cross-section data OLS regression, so 
called " Pooled OLS regression ". 
Fixed Effects 
When we are only interested in analyzing the impact of variables that vary over 
time, we can use fixed effects (FE). 
Given the individual i, average the time on both sides of the equation (4.1), we 
can get new equation: 
Y̅i = αi + X̅iβ + ?̅?𝑖                              (4.3) 
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The original equation is subtracted from the average equation to obtain the 
dispersion form of the original model: 
Yit − Y̅i = (Xit − X̅i)β + (uit − ?̅?𝑖)                    (4.4) 
Therefore, fixed effects removes the effect of those time-invariant characteristics, 
we can assess the net effect of the predictors on the outcome variable. 
Another important assumption of the FE model is that those time-invariant 
characteristics are unique to the individual and should not be correlated with other 
individual characteristics. Each entity is different therefore the entity’s error term and 
the constant (which captures individual characteristics) should not be correlated with 
the others. 
Another way to see the fixed effects model is by using binary variables. So the 
equation for the fixed effects model becomes: 
Yit = β0 + β1X1t + ⋯ βkXkt + γ2E2 + ⋯ + γnEn + uit         (4.5) 
En is the entity n. Since they are binary (dummies) we have n-1 entities included 
in the model. Fixed effects model is also called the least square dummy variable model 
(LSDV). The specific intercepts in (4.1) and the binary regressors in (4.5) have the same 
source: the unobserved variable that varies across states but not over time  
We can add time effects to the entity effects model to have a time and entity fixed effects 
regression model:  
Yit = β0 + β1X1t + ⋯ βkXkt + γ2E2 + ⋯ + γnEn + δ2T2 + ⋯ δtTt + uit (4.6) 
 56 
Tt is time as binary variable (dummy), so we have t-1 time periods. Control for time 
effects whenever unexpected variation or special events may affect the outcome 
variable. 
Random Effects 
Unlike the fixed effects model, the rationale behind random effects model is that, 
the variation across entities is assumed to be random and uncorrelated with the predictor 
or independent variables included in the model. Therefore, random effects assume that 
the entity’s error term is not correlated with the predictors which allows for time-
invariant variables to play a role as explanatory variables. 
The equation of random effects is: 
Yit = 𝛼 + Xitβ + uit + εit                          (4.7) 
uit is between-entity error, while εit is within-entity error. When dealing with panel 
data, whether we should use the fixed effects model or the random effects model is a 
fundamental problem. To decide between fixed or random effects, we can run a 
Hausman test where the null hypothesis is that the preferred model is random effects, 
while alternative hypothesis is that fixed effects is more effective than random effects. 
4. 2 Sample Selection and Variable Determination 
In this section, we will introduce the sources and reasons of our selected data, and 
then we will list all variables that we have introduced in one table. 
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4.2.1 Sample Selection 
According to the availability and completeness of the data, this thesis analyzes the 
data of 30 companies operating in China's real estate industry in 2013-2017 that were 
listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange9. As we know, in a national economy of a 
country, the real estate industry has an important position and role. In recent years, 
China's real estate market has developed rapidly, and the building stock has increased 
substantially. It has effectively solved some market demand, improved the housing level 
of urban residents, and promoted economic development. After the financial crisis, 
China's real estate regulation and control entered the second stage. As the effectiveness 
of the previous regulation and control was basically affirmed at the central level, and 
the real estate market continued to be depressed, the local government's fundamentals 
were obviously improved after 2012. The trading volume gradually recovered, the 
pressure on real estate enterprises gradually eased, and even the house prices gradually 
stabilized and rebounded. In the first half of 2013, the investment environment of 
China's real estate industry has rebounded, the volume of urban residential market has 
continued to rise, and housing prices in key cities have generally increased. Therefore, 
we choose the listed companies in China's real estate industry from 2013 to 2017. 
All the data in this paper are from the annual reports of the listed companies. The 
units of currency are Hong Kong Dollars and RMB, we ignore the units of currency as 
                                                 
9 We can find the companies through their stock codes on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, this is webpage 
address: https://www.hkex.com.hk/?sc_lang=en. 
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they have no influence on our calculated ratios. The analysis software that we used is 
Stata15. 
4.2.2 Variable Determination 
Variables Measures Symbols 
Debt Equity Ratio              Total Debt/Equity         debt/equity 
Debt Asset Ratio               Total Debt/Asset          debt/asset 
Short-Term Debt Asset Ratio     Short-Term Debt/ Asset     st debt/asset 
Long-Term Debt Asset Ratio     Long-Term Debt/ Asset     lt debt/asset 
Liquidity                Current Assets/Current Liabilities       l 
Profitability                   EBIT/Total Assets              p 
Asset Tangibility            Fixed Assets/Total Assets           t 
 
 
Tab.4.1 presents the variables and measurements applied in this research. The 
liquidity is viewed as the independent variable, while profitability and asset tangibility 
are viewed as control variables. However, capital structure is considered as the 
dependent variable, in which the debt asset ratio is measured based on short-term, long-
term and total debt. 
Tab.4.1 Design of the variables 
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4.3 Descriptive Statistics 
Tab.4.2 Descriptive Statistics of Variables 
 
 
Source: self-elaboration in Stata 15 
As shown in Tab.4.2, comp represents the company, the third to sixth rows of the 
leftmost column represents our four leverage variables. From the data of rightmost 
column, we can see that this short panel data is strongly balanced. From the middle part, 
we can see that standard deviation of within estimator of company is equal to 0, which 
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means that each entity represents the same company. While standard deviation of 
between estimator of year is equal to 0, which means that different companies have the 
same time period. The mean value of the variable liquidity is 168.9566%, which 
indicates that the ratio of total current assets of listed companies to total current 
liabilities is around 168.9566%. The difference between maximum and minimum 
numbers is very big, and this shows that these companies makes different decisions on 
their holding current assets. The mean value of the variable debt equity ratio is 
102.1984%, which indicates that the ratio of the total debt of the listed company to the 
total equity is around 102.1984%. The difference between maximum and minimum 
numbers is also very big. The mean value of the variable asset tangibility is 33.40154%, 
which indicates that the ratio of the total fixed assets of the listed company to the total 
assets is around 33.40154%. The mean value of the variable profitability is 4.4498%, 
which indicates that the ratio of the total EBIT of the listed company to the total assets 
is around 4.4498%. 
Fig.4.1 Liquidity of Selected Companies 
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Source: self-elaboration in Stata 15 
From Fig.4.1, we can see that most companies have stable development of liquidity 
ratio, but SEA Group Limited (SEA) and South China Assets Holding Limited (SCA) 
have higher liquidity ratio than others, which explains the big difference between 
maximum and minimum number. 
Fig.4.2 Debt Equity Ratio of Selected Companies 
Source: self-elaboration in Stata 15 
From Fig.4.2, we can see that the high debt equity ratio is mostly caused by 
Glorious Property Holdings Limited (GLO) and Sunac China Holdings Limited (SUN). 
This two company have no efficient operating, which caused more debts and low equity, 
so that the leverage gets higher and higher. Most of companies have stable development 
of debt equity ratio. 
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4.4 Empirical Results 
After we describe the basic features of data form selected companies, we should 
use fixed effect model and random effect model to get our results. So, we process our 
four models in turn. 
4.4.1 Empirical Analysis of Model 1 
In model 1, the dependent variable is debt to equity ratio, independent variables 
are liquidity, profitability and asset tangibility. We will analyze the pooled OLS, fixed 
effects and random effects models in turn, and then choose the best model. 
Pooled OLS 
Tab.4.3 Results of Pooled OLS 
Source: self-elaboration in Stata 15 
From the results of F statistic, we can say the model is significant overall. The 
asset tangibility and profitability are significant at 5% significance level, but asset 
tangibility is not significant, so we can say this pooled OLS model is not perfect now. 
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We should compare it with fixed effects and random effects model, and then choose the 
best model that we can use. 
Fixed Effects 
Fig.4.3 Heterogeneity Across Years 
Source: self-elaboration in Stata 15 
Fig.4.3 shows the heterogeneity across years of debt equity ratio, it is unobserved 
variable that do not change over time, but we can eliminate it through fixed effects. 






Tab.4.4 Results of Fixed Effects Model 
Source: self-elaboration in Stata 15 
On the Tab.4.4, lines three to five show the goodness of fit of the model, which is 
divided into three levels: within group, between group and overall group. We can see 
the R-squares of these three levels are 13.63%, 16.98% and 15.61%, the low R-squares 
do not represent our model is bad, the possibility is that we have just five years’ short 
panel data. 
The F statistics and the corresponding P values for the joint test of parameters are 
listed in line six and line seven respectively, which in this case are 6.15 and 0.0006. It 
indicates that the parameters are quite significant overall. 
Lines eight to eleven shows the estimated coefficients, standard deviations, t-
statistics and corresponding P-values for the explanatory variables and the 95% 
confidence interval, we can see liquidity, asset tangibility and profitability are all 
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significant at 5% significance level. It's worth mentioning that the coefficient of asset 
tangibility is equal to -1.185081, which is contrary to our economic theory. This is also 
probably caused by the short years that we selected, it is too short to reflect the 
relationship with leverage. The term _cons represents the average number of all 
individual effects αi. 
The last four lines show the variance estimates for the individual effects and 
random disturbance terms in the fixed-effects model (sigma_u and sigma_e), and the 
relationship between them (rho). We can see the rho is around equal to 0.55, which 
means that the variance of the compound disturbance term (αi.+ uit) mainly comes from 
the change of variation of the individual effect αi. 
The last line gives an estimation of whether the fixed effects model is significant 
for the F statistic and the corresponding P value. In this case, we can see that the F 
statistic is 5.64 and P value is 0.0000, so the null hypothesis is strongly rejected, that is, 
fixed effects model is clearly superior to pooled OLS model, and each individual should 
be allowed to have its own intercept term. 
Also, time effects can also be considered in the fixed effects model, for example, 
the Two-way fixed effects model. Then, we get the results of Two-way fixed effects 
model in the Tab.4.5. 
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Tab.4.5 Results of Two-way Fixed Effects Model 
Source: self-elaboration in Stata 15 
In Tab.4.5, the year 2013 is seen as base year, it is reflected in the _cons term. But 
it is not included in the above regression command, otherwise, a dummy variable trap 
will occur, resulting in full multicollinearity. The signs of time effects are all positive, 
but some annual dummy variables such as year2016 and year2017 are significant, while 
others such as year2014 and year2015 are not significant. Then, we can use a joint test 
to see if the dummies for all years are equal to 0, if they are then no time fixed effects 
are needed. 
Tab.4.6 Joint Test 
Source: self-elaboration in Stata 15 
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From Tab.4.6, it shows that the P value is less than 0.05, so we should reject the 
null hypothesis that the coefficients for all years are jointly equal to zero, therefore time 
fixed- effects are needed in this case.  
Random Effects 
Tab.4.7 Results of Random Effects Model 
Source: self-elaboration in Stata 15 
From Tab.4.7, the result of random effects is similar with fixed effects, because 
the P value is less than 0.05, we can say the model is significant overall. The three 
explanatory variables liquidity, asset tangibility and profitability are all significant at 5% 
significance level. The R-squares of three levels are 13.22%, 19.74% and 17.19%, 
similarly, it has no influence on our analysis.  
Then, for testing whether random effect is significant, we use the Breusch and 
Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test. The null hypothesis in the LM test is that variances 
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across entities is zero. This is, no significant difference across units. We can see the 
result of LM test in Tab.4.8. 
Tab.4.8 Results of LM Test 
Source: self-elaboration in Stata 15 
From the results, we can see the P value is 0.0000<0.05, so we should reject the 
null hypothesis and conclude that random effects model is appropriate. There is an 
evidence of significant differences across companies, therefore we can run the random 
effects model. 
After that, we use Hausman test to decide whether fixed effects model or random 
effects model we should process. 
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Tab.4.9 Hausman Test  
Source: self-elaboration in Stata 15 
From the result of Hausman test, because P value is more than 0.05, we conclude 
that we should accept null hypothesis, that is, we will use random effect model rather 
than fixed effects model. 
According to the results of random effects model, we can see the liquidity has 
negative relationship with debt equity ratio. Profitability is negatively related to debt 
equity ratio, which verify the conclusion of Ozkan(2001), Gaud et al.(2003), Bevan and 
Danbolt(2002). However, asset tangibility has negative relationship with debt equity 
ratio, this result is contrary to the conclusion of Jensen and Meckling(1976), Bennett 
and Donnelly (2003), Rajan and Zingales(1995) and Gaud et al.(2003). However, we 
get the same result with the conclusion of Bevan and Danbolt(2000) and Psillaki and 
Daskalakis(2008). 
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4.4.2 Empirical Analysis of Model 2 
In model 2, the dependent variable is debt to asset ratio, independent variables are 
not changed. The panel data of model 2 is also analyzed by pooled OLS model, fixed 
effects model and random effects model, and the analysis results are shown in Tab.4.10. 
Tab.4.10 Results of Three Models in Model 2. 
Source: self-elaboration in Stata 15 
From the regression results and F values in Tab.4.10, we can see both pooled OLS 
model, fixed effects model are feasible, but fixed effects model is better than pooled 
OLS model. Finally, the Hausman test is applied to test the fixed effects model and the 
random effects model, the result is showed in Tab.4.11. 
Tab.4.11 Hausman Test 
Source: self-elaboration in Stata 15 
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Since the P value is 0.2131, which is more than 0.05, so we are failed to reject null 
hypothesis, and it is considered that the random effects model should be used instead 
of the fixed effects model. 
Therefore, we can get conclusion through the results of random effects model. The 
liquidity also has negative relationship with debt asset ratio. Profitability is negatively 
related to debt asset ratio, which verify the conclusion of Ozkan(2001), Gaud et 
al.(2003), Bevan and Danbolt(2002). Similar with model 1, the asset tangibility also 
has negative relationship with debt asset ratio, so we get the same result with the 
conclusion of Bevan and Danbolt(2000) and Psillaki and Daskalakis(2008). 
4.4.3 Empirical Analysis of Model 3 
In model 3, we need explore the impacts of independent variables on short-term 
leverage. According to the above process, the panel data of model 3 is also analyzed by 
pooled OLS model, fixed effects model and random effects model, and the analysis 
results are shown in Tab.4.12. 
Tab.4.12. Results of Three Models in Model 3. 
Source: self-elaboration in Stata 15 
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From the results and F values in Tab.4.12, we can see both pooled OLS model, 
fixed effects model are feasible, but fixed effects model is better than pooled OLS 
model. After that, the Hausman test is applied to test the fixed effects model and the 
random effects model, the result is showed in Tab.4.13. 
Tab.4.13 Hausman Test 
Source: self-elaboration in Stata 15 
Because the P value is 0.0102, which is less than 0.05, we should reject null 
hypothesis, and it is considered that the fixed effects model should be used instead of 
the random effects model. 
Therefore, we can get conclusion through the results of fixed effects model. 
Likewise model 1 and model 2, the liquidity has negative relationship with short-term 
leverage. Surprisingly, profitability is positively related to short-term leverage, which 
is different with model 1 and model 2. As same with above models, the asset tangibility 
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also has negative relationship with short-term leverage, which is similar with the 
conclusion of Bevan and Danbolt(2000) and Psillaki and Daskalakis(2008). 
4.4.4 Empirical Analysis of Model 4 
In model 4, we want to know how independent variables influence the long-term 
leverage. Similar with the above process, the panel data of model 4 is analyzed by 
pooled OLS model, fixed effects model and random effects model, and the analysis 
results are shown in Tab.4.14. 
Tab.4.14 Results of Three Models in Model 4. 
Source: self-elaboration in Stata 15 
From the results and F values in Tab.4.14, we can see both pooled OLS model, 
fixed effects model are feasible, but fixed effects model is better than pooled OLS 
model. And then the Hausman test is applied to test the fixed effects model and the 
random effects model, the result is showed in Tab.4.15. 
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Tab.4.15 Hausman Test 
Source: self-elaboration in Stata 15 
From the result of Tab.4.15, we can see the P value is 0.5980, which is more than 
0.05, we are failed to reject null hypothesis, and we should use the random effects 
model rather than the fixed effects model. 
Therefore, we can get conclusion through the results of random effects model. 
Different to previous models, the liquidity has positive relationship with long-term 
leverage. Surprisingly, the asset tangibility has positive relationship with long-term 
leverage, this relationship happens at first time. Similar to model 1 and model2, 
profitability is negatively related to long-term leverage. 
4.5 Findings 
In this section, we mainly focus on the test of our hypothesis presented in chapter 




Liquidity is calculated as the ratio of current assets to current liabilities. Through 
our results, we find liquidity is significant negatively related to all types of leverage 
except long-term leverage. Therefore, we can accept hypothesis 1A and 1B, reject 
hypothesis 1C. Our results mostly are in consistent with the theory of Ozkan (2001), 
this inverse relation may arise from potential conflicts between shareholders and 
debtholders. In other words, firms with high level of liquidity have more liquid assets 
and hold less amount of debt, which leads to lower leverage. 
4.5.2 Profitability 
Profitability is calculated as the ratio of EBIT to total assets. Our regression results 
of models have shown that profitability has negative relationship with leverage except 
for short-term leverage. Thus, we can accept hypothesis 2A and 2C, reject hypothesis 
2B. Overall our results reflect the pecking order theory. Based on pecking order theory, 
if a firm makes profits, it prefers considering retained earnings as a primary source of 
financing new investments, in other words, profitable firms prefer internal financing 
rather than external financing. But overall our results do not support the trade off theory, 
this theory indicates that firms with high profits tend to have leverage and more taxable 
income to shield, only relationship between profitability and short-term leverage can 
prove this theory. 
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4.5.3 Asset Tangibility 
Asset tangibility is calculated as the ratio of fixed assets to total assets. The results 
show that there is mix correlation between asset tangibility and different leverages. In 
model 1, model 2 and model 3, asset tangibility is negatively correlated to total and 
short-term leverage. On the contrary, it has positive relationship with long-term 
leverage. Hence, we should reject hypothesis 3A and 3B, accept hypothesis 3C. It is 
consistent with the theory that firms are more likely to employ long-term debt for fixed 
assets. This is because the tangible assets are easy to collateralize and therefore it 




Our main aim is to find the relationships between capital structure and asset 
liquidity, in addition, we add some other variables such as asset tangibility and 
profitability. This research covers 30 listed Chinese companies from annual reports in 
real estate industry from 2013 to 2017. In the theoretical part, we introduced the 
importance of liquidity and the link between capital structure and asset liquidity. In the 
practical part, we used Stata15 to find relationship between capital structure and asset 
liquidity and verified our hypotheses. 
In this chapter, we firstly summarize the previous researches, then illustrate the 
policy recommendations and research outlook. 
According to four regression models, generally we can say leverage is negatively 
related to liquidity and profitability. While asset tangibility only has positive 
relationship with long-term leverage. As mentioned in previous chapter, regression 
results are consistent with different capital structure theories. The negative correlation 
between profitability and leverage supports the pecking order theory, the positive 
correlation between asset tangibility and long-term leverage supports the agency theory. 
In past chapters, we also mention that some scholars hold different opinions of capital 
structure theories. For example, Gaud et al. (2005) supports negative correlation 
between profitability and leverage, while Jensen (1986) indicates that there is positive 
relationship between profitability and leverage. In a word, the contradictions of capital 
structure theories are normal, they complement each other. 
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Under the conclusion of this thesis, when there is too much debt financing, it will 
cause insufficient liquidity. At the same time, when the financing cost is high, the firms 
adjust the capital structure to reduce the financial leverage, which may cause excess 
liquidity within the enterprise. Therefore, when the enterprise adjusts its capital 
structure, it should take into account the liquidity, so as to rationally control the flow of 
assets and improve the efficiency of funds using. 
What’s more, strengthening the construction of laws and regulations, improving 
the market environment and increase transparency in the financing market should be 
implemented, so that investors and firms can effectively obtain sufficient resources and 
less transaction costs. 
There are several limitations in this research. Firstly, we use only three 
independent variables, and maybe there are some other influencing variables we have 
ignored. Secondly, the number of selected listed companies is only 30, which is a 
limited sample. Thirdly, we just choose the time period from 2013 to 2017, so we cannot 
expect to get perfect results from such short panel data. 
Therefore, using different independent variables will get more precise results. The 
sample size of further research can be extended with unlisted or small firms to get more 
reliable results. Also, the further research can extend the period of time and examine 
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Annex 1: List of Companies Analyzed 
Name Abbreviation HK Stock Code 
Agile Property Holdings Limited AGP 3383 
Beijing Capital Land Ltd. BCL 2868 
Beijing Properties (Holdings) Limited BPH 925 
Central China Real Estate Limited CTC 0832 
China Aoyuan Properties Company Limited AYP 3883 
China SCE Property Holdings Limited SCE 1966 
Country Garden Holdings Company Limited CGH 2007 
Evergrande Real Estate Group Limited EVE 3333 
Fantasia Holdings Group Co.Limited FAN 1777 
Far East Consortium International Limited FEC 0035 
Glorious Property Holdings Limited GLO 0845 
Greentown China Holdings Limited GRE 3900 
Guangzhou R&F Properties Co., Ltd GZP 2777 
Hopson Development Holdings Limited HSD 754 
Kwg Property Holding Limited KWG 1813 
Long Properties Co. Ltd. LON 1238 
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Powerlong Real Estate Holdings Limited PRS 1238 
SEA Group SEA 0251 
Shanghai Industrial Urban Development 
Group Limited 
SIU 0563 
Shenzhen Investment Limited SZI 604 
Shimao Property Holdings Limited SHI 0813 
Sino Harbour Property Group Limited SHP 1663 
SOHO China SOH 410 
South China Assets Holdings Limited SCA 8155 
SRE Group Limited SRE 1207 
Sunac China Holdings Limited SUN 1918 
Tian Shan Development (Holding) Limited TSD 2118 
Yuzhou Properties Company Limited YZP 1628 
Zhong An Real Estate Limited ZAN 0672 






Annex 2: Panel Data of Companies Analyzed 










l t p 
PRS 2013 0.93 0.34 0.09 0.24 1.60 0.48 0.04 
PRS 2014 0.90 0.33 0.08 0.25 1.49 0.51 0.04 
PRS 2015 1.00 0.34 0.09 0.25 1.38 0.52 0.03 
PRS 2016 1.16 0.38 0.10 0.28 1.38 0.53 0.06 
PRS 2017 1.21 0.37 0.10 0.27 1.28 0.52 0.07 
CGH 2013 0.72 0.16 0.05 0.11 1.27 0.44 0.06 
CGH 2014 0.62 0.14 0.05 0.10 1.23 0.28 0.06 
CGH 2015 0.60 0.15 0.06 0.09 1.35 0.25 0.04 
CGH 2016 0.85 0.12 0.05 0.07 1.20 0.18 0.04 
CGH 2017 1.16 0.13 0.05 0.08 1.13 0.17 0.04 
GZP 2013 1.37 0.33 0.02 0.31 1.80 0.24 0.10 
GZP 2014 0.93 0.28 0.02 0.27 1.87 0.23 0.07 
GZP 2015 1.13 0.30 0.03 0.27 1.72 0.22 0.07 
GZP 2016 2.09 0.43 0.05 0.39 2.04 0.21 0.06 
GZP 2017 1.99 0.43 0.05 0.38 1.90 0.28 0.10 
SHP 2013 0.45 0.23 0.04 0.19 2.60 0.22 0.09 
SHP 2014 0.86 0.22 0.07 0.14 0.78 0.17 0.04 
SHP 2015 0.84 0.31 0.19 0.13 1.67 0.18 0.04 
SHP 2016 0.53 0.24 0.11 0.13 1.84 0.27 0.04 
SHP 2017 0.52 0.26 0.07 0.19 2.65 0.26 0.04 
KWG 2013 1.17 0.34 0.05 0.29 1.46 0.41 0.06 
KWG 2014 1.20 0.34 0.05 0.29 1.48 0.42 0.06 
KWG 2015 1.25 0.35 0.05 0.30 1.32 0.47 0.06 
KWG 2016 1.79 0.39 0.04 0.34 1.58 0.32 0.04 
KWG 2017 2.11 0.44 0.03 0.41 1.65 0.39 0.04 
EVE 2013 1.37 0.31 0.10 0.21 1.54 0.17 0.07 
EVE 2014 1.39 0.33 0.17 0.16 1.43 0.19 0.06 
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EVE 2015 2.09 0.39 0.21 0.18 1.34 0.19 0.04 
EVE 2016 2.78 0.40 0.15 0.25 1.52 0.18 0.04 
EVE 2017 3.02 0.42 0.20 0.21 1.40 0.14 0.05 
GLO 2013 0.97 0.35 0.10 0.26 2.03 0.30 0.01 
GLO 2014 1.34 0.41 0.29 0.12 1.31 0.27 -0.05 
GLO 2015 1.93 0.46 0.44 0.01 0.96 0.32 -0.07 
GLO 2016 3.19 0.50 0.34 0.17 1.06 0.34 -0.09 
GLO 2017 3.91 0.45 0.34 0.11 0.89 0.36 -0.04 
FAN 2013 0.89 0.23 0.07 0.16 1.80 0.29 0.08 
FAN 2014 0.68 0.19 0.10 0.09 1.55 0.32 0.06 
FAN 2015 0.32 0.09 0.03 0.06 1.59 0.30 0.06 
FAN 2016 0.26 0.07 0.02 0.05 2.05 0.35 0.05 
FAN 2017 0.56 0.14 0.04 0.10 1.73 0.33 0.04 
CTC 2013 0.23 0.05 0.02 0.03 1.26 0.25 0.06 
CTC 2014 0.43 0.08 0.03 0.05 1.36 0.20 0.05 
CTC 2015 0.30 0.05 0.03 0.03 1.22 0.26 0.04 
CTC 2016 0.34 0.05 0.01 0.04 1.39 0.23 0.02 
CTC 2017 0.46 0.06 0.01 0.05 1.10 0.25 0.03 
LON 2013 0.69 0.19 0.06 0.13 1.36 0.32 0.09 
LON 2014 0.80 0.24 0.05 0.19 1.48 0.35 0.08 
LON 2015 0.71 0.24 0.03 0.21 1.69 0.35 0.08 
LON 2016 0.70 0.23 0.02 0.21 1.51 0.38 0.07 
LON 2017 0.65 0.19 0.01 0.18 1.32 0.36 0.07 
GRE 2013 0.69 0.18 0.05 0.13 1.56 0.17 0.07 
GRE 2014 0.78 0.21 0.10 0.12 1.57 0.16 0.05 
GRE 2015 0.75 0.19 0.09 0.10 1.68 0.15 0.02 
GRE 2016 0.92 0.21 0.06 0.15 1.68 0.13 0.02 
GRE 2017 0.79 0.16 0.05 0.10 1.47 0.10 0.03 
SUN 2013 1.58 0.29 0.08 0.21 1.69 0.09 0.06 
SUN 2014 1.64 0.31 0.12 0.18 1.50 0.13 0.03 
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SUN 2015 2.15 0.36 0.13 0.24 1.45 0.19 0.05 
SUN 2016 3.19 0.38 0.11 0.27 1.50 0.14 0.02 
SUN 2017 3.62 0.35 0.13 0.23 1.30 0.20 0.04 
SHI 2013 0.95 0.24 0.07 0.21 1.43 0.14 0.07 
SHI 2014 0.95 0.28 0.08 0.20 1.45 0.29 0.07 
SHI 2015 0.93 0.29 0.07 0.22 1.58 0.28 0.06 
SHI 2016 0.76 0.26 0.07 0.19 1.60 0.28 0.06 
SHI 2017 0.90 0.28 0.06 0.23 1.64 0.28 0.06 
BCL 2013 0.75 0.11 0.02 0.19 1.85 0.13 0.04 
BCL 2014 1.09 0.30 0.07 0.23 1.99 0.14 0.04 
BCL 2015 1.15 0.27 0.03 0.24 2.38 0.19 0.04 
BCL 2016 0.81 0.19 0.02 0.17 1.97 0.21 0.03 
BCL 2017 0.75 0.17 0.01 0.16 1.69 0.21 0.03 
TSD 2013 0.33 0.34 0.02 0.05 1.46 0.13 0.04 
TSD 2014 0.21 0.04 0.01 0.04 1.44 0.12 0.06 
TSD 2015 0.43 0.07 0.03 0.05 1.27 0.11 0.03 
TSD 2016 1.11 0.14 0.05 0.09 1.35 0.07 0.02 
TSD 2017 1.92 0.19 0.06 0.13 1.40 0.06 0.02 
AGP 2013 1.01 0.32 0.11 0.22 1.68 0.28 0.09 
AGP 2014 1.03 0.34 0.13 0.21 1.70 0.24 0.08 
AGP 2015 0.95 0.34 0.14 0.20 1.78 0.23 0.07 
AGP 2016 1.00 0.33 0.10 0.24 1.74 0.27 0.07 
AGP 2017 1.40 0.38 0.17 0.21 1.35 0.31 0.10 
YZP 2013 0.86 0.24 0.07 0.16 1.90 0.20 0.09 
YZP 2014 0.92 0.22 0.10 0.12 1.71 0.24 0.07 
YZP 2015 1.43 0.28 0.08 0.20 1.75 0.15 0.06 
YZP 2016 0.88 0.15 0.07 0.08 1.47 0.24 0.06 
YZP 2017 0.79 0.17 0.08 0.09 1.32 0.21 0.08 
AYP 2013 1.08 0.27 0.08 0.19 1.79 0.11 0.04 
AYP 2014 0.91 0.22 0.12 0.10 1.63 0.10 0.04 
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AYP 2015 0.64 0.15 0.05 0.10 1.90 0.12 0.03 
AYP 2016 0.46 0.10 0.05 0.06 1.66 0.10 0.03 
AYP 2017 1.02 0.22 0.11 0.11 1.54 0.08 0.03 
SCE 2013 0.65 0.21 0.09 0.12 1.53 0.40 0.07 
SCE 2014 0.73 0.23 0.11 0.13 1.66 0.32 0.07 
SCE 2015 0.56 0.16 0.10 0.07 1.61 0.31 0.06 
SCE 2016 1.03 0.24 0.07 0.18 1.35 0.39 0.07 
SCE 2017 0.76 0.19 0.07 0.12 1.20 0.37 0.08 
ZAN 2013 0.88 0.32 0.05 0.27 1.33 0.55 0.05 
ZAN 2014 1.00 0.34 0.10 0.24 0.94 0.63 0.03 
ZAN 2015 0.82 0.28 0.10 0.18 1.20 0.48 0.05 
ZAN 2016 0.68 0.26 0.11 0.15 1.26 0.48 0.01 
ZAN 2017 0.50 0.20 0.07 0.13 1.30 0.45 0.06 
SOH 2013 0.29 0.14 0.04 0.11 1.14 0.72 0.15 
SOH 2014 0.35 0.18 0.02 0.17 1.54 0.77 0.08 
SOH 2015 0.43 0.23 0.03 0.20 1.18 0.80 0.03 
SOH 2016 0.35 0.18 0.04 0.14 0.71 0.86 0.04 
SOH 2017 0.53 0.25 0.04 0.21 1.02 0.83 0.12 
BPH 2013 0.32 0.20 0.04 0.17 1.25 0.85 0.14 
BPH 2014 0.53 0.24 0.09 0.15 0.74 0.82 0.03 
BPH 2015 0.46 0.18 0.16 0.02 1.17 0.66 0.03 
BPH 2016 0.46 0.20 0.02 0.18 2.07 0.73 0.01 
BPH 2017 0.45 0.17 0.01 0.16 0.72 0.85 0.02 
HSD 2013 0.71 0.29 0.07 0.22 2.20 0.29 0.05 
HSD 2014 0.85 0.34 0.09 0.26 2.32 0.31 0.03 
HSD 2015 0.83 0.33 0.08 0.25 2.23 0.34 0.02 
HSD 2016 0.79 0.34 0.07 0.26 2.44 0.36 0.04 
HSD 2017 0.80 0.35 0.10 0.24 2.17 0.41 0.06 
SCA 2013 0.24 0.19 0.03 0.16 4.82 0.48 0.10 
SCA 2014 0.26 0.15 0.03 0.12 1.77 0.50 0.00 
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SCA 2015 0.21 0.16 0.02 0.14 1.67 0.85 0.02 
SCA 2016 2.04 0.50 0.01 0.49 1.99 0.47 -0.28 
SCA 2017 2.72 0.55 0.01 0.53 2.23 0.41 0.04 
SIU 2013 0.58 0.21 0.07 0.14 1.90 0.18 0.01 
SIU 2014 1.00 0.35 0.14 0.21 1.91 0.29 0.03 
SIU 2015 1.14 0.35 0.08 0.27 2.04 0.25 0.02 
SIU 2016 0.68 0.25 0.01 0.24 2.30 0.31 0.04 
SIU 2017 0.70 0.27 0.06 0.21 2.16 0.32 0.05 
SRE 2013 1.63 0.49 0.17 0.32 2.34 0.25 0.02 
SRE 2014 2.04 0.52 0.19 0.33 2.10 0.26 0.02 
SRE 2015 1.36 0.31 0.24 0.07 1.24 0.20 -0.06 
SRE 2016 0.96 0.30 0.17 0.13 1.17 0.40 0.00 
SRE 2017 1.10 0.38 0.11 0.27 1.28 0.60 0.05 
SZI 2013 0.88 0.32 0.16 0.16 1.61 0.35 0.07 
SZI 2014 0.90 0.31 0.13 0.18 1.71 0.37 0.06 
SZI 2015 0.60 0.23 0.06 0.18 1.81 0.39 0.07 
SZI 2016 0.55 0.20 0.05 0.15 1.57 0.41 0.09 
SZI 2017 0.51 0.20 0.07 0.13 1.35 0.46 0.07 
FEC 2013 0.72 0.34 0.24 0.10 1.24 0.56 0.05 
FEC 2014 0.76 0.34 0.19 0.15 1.64 0.54 0.06 
FEC 2015 0.74 0.34 0.14 0.20 1.67 0.54 0.06 
FEC 2016 1.05 0.41 0.11 0.30 2.12 0.48 0.04 
FEC 2017 0.93 0.36 0.10 0.26 2.57 0.44 0.06 
SEA 2013 0.27 0.20 0.09 0.11 1.69 0.79 0.04 
SEA 2014 0.33 0.23 0.03 0.20 4.07 0.74 0.04 
SEA 2015 0.33 0.24 0.08 0.15 2.28 0.74 0.08 
SEA 2016 0.35 0.25 0.13 0.12 4.64 0.34 0.05 
SEA 2017 1.80 0.58 0.33 0.25 1.11 0.62 0.00 
ZGH 2013 1.22 0.39 0.13 0.26 2.50 0.07 -0.08 
ZGH 2014 2.30 0.44 0.13 0.31 2.34 0.05 0.05 
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ZGH 2015 1.96 0.47 0.20 0.27 1.89 0.11 0.07 
ZGH 2016 1.62 0.42 0.04 0.38 2.62 0.13 0.01 
ZGH 2017 2.15 0.46 0.07 0.40 2.48 0.11 0.02 
 
